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Lawrence Friedman"
I. INTRODUCTION
In support of its effort to fight terrorism, the administration of
George W. Bush proposed to try individuals detained indefinitely
in respect to alleged terrorist activities before military tribunals.
The United States Supreme Court subsequently struck down the
Bush administration's tribunal system in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.1
In the wake of that 2006 decision, the administration sought to
reach a compromise over a successor system with members of the
House of Representatives and the Senate who favored a scheme of
military commissions that would provide greater protections to
terrorism suspects than the administration preferred. One
feature of the system upon which the sides differed was whether
these individuals could be tried and convicted on the basis of
secret evidence - protected information, whether classified or
related to national security, that only the military attorneys and
members of the military commissions would be allowed to view in
discovery or at trial.2
* Associate Professor of Law, New England School of Law.
Assistant Professor of Law, New England School of Law.
1. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
2. "Secret evidence" has been defined as "information of potential
evidentiary value not shared with the defendant, and often not shared with
defense counsel." Ellen Yaroshefsky, Secret Evidence is Slowly Eroding the
Adversary System: CIPA and FISA in the Courts, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1063,
1064 (2006); see also Note, Secret Evidence in the War on Terror, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 1962, 1962 n.7 (2005) (defining "secret evidence" as "evidence - whether
classified or unclassified - that is not disclosed to the accused himself"). See
also infra note 9 (discussing Department of Defense definition of "protected
information").
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Statutory and procedural standards exist under federal law
and military rules for preventing the disclosure of protected
information relating to national security. But the Bush
administration did not link its proposal to those laws, which
effectively compel the government, in cases in which protected
information is relevant, to choose between non-disclosure of the
information in any form, or prosecution of the case with disclosure
to the defendant and defense counsel. The administration claimed
that, in the context of trials of terrorism suspects, the government
cannot be forced to make that choice because of the practical need
to safeguard information that might reflect such highly sensitive
matters as operational intelligence.
In the event, the administration did not prevail; the
compromise legislation, though it did not provide terrorism
suspects detained as enemy combatants the full panoply of
individual rights protections enjoyed by criminal defendants in
federal courts, did not authorize the use of secret evidence. 3 That
Congress and the president reached an agreement on this issue in
2006 is of no small moment, but even five years after September
11 national security policymaking could only be viewed as a
dynamic enterprise. Administrations and congressional
membership change, after all,4 and a compromise on such a
divisive issue in 2006 is not necessarily a policy point upon which
future leaders may be content to rest. And so in this Article we
address a central question the administration's proposal raised:
can the use of secret evidence ever be justified in the trials of
terrorism suspects before military tribunals?
We approach this question assuming that the Bush
administration, which lost several times in the United States
Supreme Court in cases involving aspects of its national security
3. See generally, Military Comm'ns Act of 2006, S. 3930, 109th Cong.
(2003) available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military Law/pdf/S-
3930_passed.pdf. This act establishes a process relating to protected
information which is similar to the process set forth in the Classified
Information Procedures Act.
4. Following the 2006 midterm elections, in which Democrats won back
both the House of Representatives and the Senate, President Bush's
secretary of defense, Donald Rumsfeld, a leading architect of administration
policy regarding terrorism suspects detained as enemy combatants, resigned.
See Michael Kranish & Farah Stockman, Rumsfeld Goes at 'Critical' Time in
War, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 9, 2006, at Al.
774 ROGER WILLLAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:772
program, made the best possible case for the use of secret evidence
in military tribunals. In determining whether the administration
had the better of the argument, we look at the issue from the
perspectives of history and of precedent in United States military
courts and in Article III courts. That review demonstrates that
there is wisdom to be learned from past experience, both in
respect to pragmatic policymaking for the nation and the soldiers
who defend it, and in respect to the ongoing discussion about the
rule of law in times of crisis.
We begin, in Part I, by discussing in detail the case for
allowing the use of secret evidence. We rely for the argument in
favor of secret evidence upon policy statements issued by Bush
administration officials and like-minded commentators indicating
that practical considerations about protected information underlie
the proposal. We view this argument through the filter of the
Court's decision in Hamdan and the administration's stated belief
that the use of secret evidence would run afoul of no domestic
legal prohibition.
In Part II, we focus on the practical implications of the Bush
administration's argument in favor of secret evidence, and
responses to that argument. 5 Part II discusses the lessons that
may be learned from the military and civilian experiences with
protected information. We examine the requirements of the
Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA)6 and its counterpart
in the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ),7 and how those
regulations have been used by military and Article III judges to
manage the use of classified information in discovery and at trial.
In addition, we review the standards the United States Supreme
Court has established for the use of confidential information in
proceedings not concerned with national security, as well as the
protective measures that trial court judges may take to ensure
that such information remains protected throughout the course of
5. Commentators have raised substantive criticisms of secret evidence
based upon due process concerns, see Note, supra note 2, at 1976-83, and the
implications for the ethical obligations of defense counsel, see Yaroshefsky,
supra note 2, at 1081-85. We do not rehearse those arguments here, as our
look at the practical reasons supporting the use of secret evidence and the
Bush administration's argument in favor of its use seeks to draw out the
reasons for that advocacy and the dangers such reasoning pose.
6. Classified Info. Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. § App. III (2003).
7. MIL. R. EVID. 505.
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criminal proceedings. We conclude that ample precedents exist to
provide guidance on how to manage the practical problems posed
by the use of protected information in the trials of terrorism
suspects.
Given our conclusion that the practical argument in favor of
secret evidence in the trials of terrorism suspects is best viewed as
a makeweight, in Part III we explore the possible reasons
underlying the administration's preference for secret evidence, the
legitimacy of those reasons, and the potential consequences of
endorsing the use of secret evidence in cases involving our own
forces in courts-martial, and ordinary criminal defendants in
Article III courts. To ensure that steps are taken to avoid the
realization of those consequences, we outline a series of
recommendations for Congress to consider that will serve
effectively to check the use of secret evidence by future
administrations in proceedings designed to operate in moments of
national crisis.
II. THE CASE FOR SECRET EVIDENCE
In this Part we address the genesis and substance of the Bush
administration's argument that certain information must be
withheld from terrorism defendants. We aim here to sketch the
argument based upon public documents and the arguments the
administration's lawyers made in connection with the Hamdan
case, before turning in Part II to a review of the ways in which
Congress, the military, and the courts have managed the issue of
secret evidence in the past.
A. Pre-Hamdan
The Bush administration's first attempt to address the use of
protected information in the context of the military commissions is
found in Department of Defense Military Commission Order
Number 1 dated March 21, 2002.8 In this order the
administration set out a position that placed a preeminence on
preventing the disclosure of protected information.9 According to
8. Military Comm'n Order No., U.S. Dep't of Def., 1 (Mar. 21, 2002)
available at http:// www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/d20020321ord.pdf
[hereinafter MCO (Mar. 21, 2002)].
9. Protected information is defined as:
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the order, the presiding officer' 0 of each commission shall sua
sponte, or upon motion of the prosecutor, take the steps necessary
to protect the interests of the United States with regard to state
secrets and protected information." I
Under the order, the presiding officer could take a number of
actions to protect the interests of the United States during the
proceedings. Most restrictively the presiding officer could delete
specified items of protected information from documents to be
made available to the accused, the detailed defense counsel or
civilian defense counsel. 12 The presiding officer could also direct a
portion or a summary of the protected information be provided in
lieu of the protected information. 13 Finally, the presiding officer
could substitute the protected information with a statement of the
relevant facts that, the protected information would tend to
prove. 14
In addition to these measures, the presiding officer could
direct the closure of the proceedings or a portion of the
proceedings in order to prevent the disclosure of protected
information. 15 As part of the closure the presiding officer could
exclude the accused and the civilian defense counsel from the
(i) information classified or classifiable pursuant to [Executive Order
12958]; (ii) information protected by law or rule from unauthorized
disclosure; (iii) information the disclosure of which may endanger
the physical safety of participants in Commission proceedings,
including prospective witnesses; (iv) information concerning
intelligence and law enforcement sources, methods, or activities; or
(v) information concerning other national security interests.
See id. at para. 6D(5)(a).
10. Under the initial order, the presiding officer was a military judge
advocate officer who ruled on all issues of admissibility, advised the other
members as to the law, and who also was a voting member of the commission.
See id. para. 4(5)(a)-(d). Under the revised commission order the presiding
officer was a non-voting member of the commission, with other duties
remaining the same. See U.S. Dep't of Def., Military Commission Order No. 1
(Aug. 31, 2005), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/ news/
Sep2005/d20050902order.pdf.
11. See MCO (Mar. 21, 2002) supra note 8, at para. 6D(5)(b). Under the
original commission structure, the presiding officer of the commission must
be a military officer who is a judge advocate of any military service. Id. para.
4A(4).
12. See id. at para. 6D(5)(b).
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id. at para. 6B(3).
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proceedings. 16  Though detailed defense counsel could not be
excluded, they would be restricted from disclosing any information
presented during the closed sessions to the client or the civilian
defense counsel without the prior approval of the presiding
officer.17 Requests for limited disclosure of protected information
and the closure of the proceedings to the accused and the civilian
defense counsel could be made by the prosecutor ex parte and in
camera.18  Finally, under the initial order, no protected
information could be admitted into evidence for consideration by
the commission unless it was presented to the detailed defense
counsel. 19
On August 31, 2005, the Secretary of Defense issued a new
order on military commissions which superseded the March 2002
order.20 This version of the military commission procedures took a
slightly different approach to protected information by placing two
additional hurdles that the prosecution must clear before the
commission could consider the protected information. The new
order kept the same restrictions in place on the use and disclosure
of protected information. The presiding officer still has the ability
to close the proceedings to the accused and the civilian defense
counsel.21 Under the new order if the presiding officer denies the
accused and the civilian defense counsel access to the protected
information, that protected information cannot be introduced as
evidence without the approval of the chief prosecutor. In addition,
the presiding officer will not admit the protected information into
evidence if it would result in the denial of a full and fair trial for
the accused. 22 It was this order that the Supreme Court reviewed
and ultimately struck down in Hamdan.23
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id. at paras. 6D(5)(b) and 6B(3).
19. See id.at para. 6D(5)(b).
20. See Military Comm'n Order No. 1, U.S. Dep't of Def., (August 31,
2005), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep20O5/d2OO50902order.pdf [hereinafter
MCO (Aug. 31, 2005)]
21. See id. at paras. 6D(5)(b) and 6B(3).
22. See id. at para. 6D(5)(b).
23. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
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B. The Bush Administration's Rationale
The initial military commission order of 2002 and the
superseding commission order of 2005 represent a significant
departure in the manner in which this evidence is treated by
Article III courts and by military courts-martial under the
Uniformed Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).24  The
administration plainly preferred a process that removed any
possibility of disclosure of protected information. Significantly,
the two parties that could be denied access to this information
were the accused and his civilian defense counsel.
The administration's concern about revealing protected
information to an accused is understandable: it is the accused who
has been identified and charged with violations of the law of war
and terrorist actions directed against the United States. There is
a legitimate fear that, once the accused has access to this
protected information, he could seek to use it in furtherance of his
own criminal conduct as well as to aid the enemies of the United
States. 25 Some control is accordingly necessary.
It bears remembering, however, that the detainees at
Guantanamo are not in an ordinary situation. The United States
military would have complete control over them before, during,
and after the conduct of the military commissions; they are
confined and virtually cut off from any access to the outside world
except under terms dictated by the military. Even if the detainees
were acquitted by a military commission, the administration made
clear it would continue to detain these individuals at least for the
duration of the war on terror or until the detainee would no longer
be considered a threat.26
The other party that can be denied access to protected
information is the civilian defense counsel, if the accused is so
represented. It is not immediately clear why the civilian defense
counsel poses a greater threat to national security than anyone
else in the proceedings. Under the commission order, any civilian
24. A more detailed discussion of the procedures used in Article III courts
and under the UCMJ will be discussed in the next section of the paper. Infra
Part II.
25. See Note, supra note 2, at 1963.
26. See Press Briefing, Dep't of Def., (Briefing on Military Comm'ns)
(May 22, 2003) available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2003/
b05222003_bt355-03.html.
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defense counsel who represents a detainee must be a U.S. citizen;
admitted to practice law in a state, district, territory or possession
of the United States; not subject to professional sanction for
relevant misconduct; eligible for access to information classified at
the SECRET level or higher; and willing to comply with the
regulations and instruction for counsel. 27
In light of the controls that the United States already places
both on the detainees and their civilian defense counsel, it is
important to articulate and understand the administration's
rationale for placing such a strong preference on protecting
certain information. This is no simple task: the administration
has not been a model of clarity or precision in justifying the
procedures it sought to impose at the trial of detainees. At a
minimum, the rationale for the use of military commissions
centers on national security and the protection of sensitive
information. In his order on November 13, 2001, President Bush
stated that, "[g]iven the danger to the safety of the United States
and the nature of international terrorism,"28 non-citizens would be
detained, and, when tried, would be tried by military tribunals. 29
Subsequent statements by administration and Pentagon officials
elaborated on this theme. One administration official stated that
the president's principal objective in using military commissions
was to "set up a body of rules that will allow us to protect
information to achieve additional intelligence gathering purposes
that may lead to the capture of more terrorists. '30 Other officials
noted that the commission order "capitalize[s] on the flexibility
needed because of the increased need to protect intelligence
information that occurs during an armed conflict. ''31
Often, however, these statements lack any specific
27. MCO (Aug. 31, 2005), supra note 20, at para. 4C(3)(b).
28. Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and
Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 3 C.F.R. 918
(2001), Reprinted in 10 U.S.C. § 801 (Supp. IV 2004) [hereinafter President's
Military Order].
29. See id.
30. Background Briefing on Military Comm'ns, U.S. Dep't of Def. (July 3,
2003) available at http://www.defenselink.millTranscripts/Transcript.
aspx?TranscriptID=2797.
31. Background Briefing on the Release of Military Comm'n Instructions,
U.S. Dep't of Def. (May 2, 2003) available at http://www.defenselink.mill
transcripts/2003/tr20030502-0144.html.
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articulation defining the necessity of particular rules dealing with
protected information. John Altenburg, selected by the Secretary
of Defense to serve as the Appointing Authority for the military
commissions, articulated the rationale for, the military
commissions as follows:
[T]he government chose for many'different reasons to use
a military commission process. It doesn't mean that the
others were wrong. It just means that the government
chose on balance, given the nature of the allegations that
were being made and I think especially national security
interests, that they chose to use the commission process,
thinking that that would meet the balanced needs. 32
This is hardly a clear and specific explanation of the rationale
for military commissions and it. certainly leaves one to question
the administration's motives.
The government's brief in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld likely offers
the most specific justification for the military commission's
treatment of protected evidence. According to the government,
military commissions have a long history under United States and
international law. 33  Under United States law, military
commissions are the military's "common law courts. '34 These
commissions are not bound by an established set or rules or
procedure. Rather, the commissions and their procedures are
created and adapted in each instance to meet the needs of that
specific occasion. 35 The argument then follows that the attacks on
September 11, 2001 represented a new threat by Al Qaeda and
other international terrorist organizations. These organizations
are able to operate across international boarders and within the
United States itself. The objective of these organizations is to
cause massive death, injuries, and property destruction. 36  If
members of these terrorist organizations had access to protected
information they would use that information to plot and carry out
32. Def. Dep't Briefing on Military Comm'n Hearings, U.S. Dep't of Def.
(Aug. 17, 2004) available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20O40817-1164.html.
33. Brief for Respondent-Appellee at 21-24, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.
Ct 2749 (2006) (No. 05-184).
34. Id. at 45.
35. Id.
36. See President's Military Order, supra note 28.
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future terrorist attacks; learn of the government's efforts to
discover and disrupt terrorist cells and terrorist plots; reveal
government plans and efforts to other members of their terrorist
organizations; discover members of their organizations who may
be cooperating with the government; and use the information in
possibly even unknown ways to further their terrorist activities
against the United States and its interests. These reasons
necessitate the use of the military commissions procedures for
protected information, as opposed to the procedures provided in
Article III courts or in courts-martial.
In addition, the government contends that in the war on
terror the battlefield is not confined to traditional boundaries. 37
Because the battlefield is virtually everywhere and the threat can
come from any direction, national security concerns are
paramount. The procedures set forth under military commissions
for protected information, the argument would continue, remain
the best way to protect against this ubiquitous threat. Different
and more open procedures regarding protected information would
be inappropriate and inadequate to defend against this threat.38
C. Analysis of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
The Court considered these arguments in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld 39 when it ruled on the constitutionality and legality of
the administration's military commissions procedures. 40  In
Hamdan the Court invalidated the military commissions
procedures established by the president.41 Among the Court's
reasons for striking the military commissions was the concern
over the procedures related to protected information - the Court
37. See Background Briefing on the Release of Military Comm'n
Instructions, U.S. Dep't of Def. (May 2, 2003) available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts /2003/tr20030502-0144.html.
38. See Military Comm'n Charges Referred, U.S. Dep't of Def. (Dec. 19,
2005) available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2005/nr20O51219-
12183.html.
39. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
40. The Hamdan opinion raises and addresses a number of issues
relevant to the military commissions. Id.at 2762. It is not the purpose of this
article to discuss all of these issues; rather, the focus here is on the specific
provisions relating to protected evidence, which the court struck down. Id. at
2798.
41. Id.
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focused on a process that could prevent the accused and his
civilian defense counsel from ever learning what evidence was
presented during any proceeding that was "closed. '42 The Court
held that this procedure was both an unjustified departure from
the procedures established under the UCMJ, and the procedures
violated the requirements of the law of war as set out in common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. 43
Article 21 of the UCMJ codified the well established principle
that military commissions have concurrent jurisdiction with
courts-martial to try offenses and offenders by statute or by the
law of war.44 Article 36 of the UCMJ sets out in general terms the
procedural requirements for military commissions. Under Article
36, to the extent that the president considers practicable, the
military commission procedures should apply the principles of law
and the rules of evidence generally recognizable in Article III
courts.4 5  Additionally, the rules and regulations for military
commissions should, again insofar as practicable, match the rules
and regulations for courts-martial, and other military tribunals.46
The Court held that the president's military commission rules
regarding protected evidence ran afoul of both Article 21 and
Article 36 of the UCMJ. 47
The Court noted that Article 36 does not absolutely prevent
the military commission from establishing procedures that are
different than procedures in Article III courts or the procedures
used in courts-martial or other military tribunals. 48 In order for
those differences to comply with Article 36, however, certain
conditions must be met.49 In order for the procedures to lawfully
differ from procedures found in Article III courts, the president
must determine that it would be impractical to apply those
procedures to military commissions. 50 The Court found that the
president had made that determination and the Court gave him
42. See id. at 2786-88.
43. Id. at 2762.
44. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2003).
45. Id. at § 836(a).
46. Id. at § 836(b).
47. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2775-87.
48. Id. at 2780.
49. Id. at 2788-94.
50. 10 U.S.C. § 836(a) (2000).
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complete deference as to that decision. 5 1
The Court ruled that a different determination would be
required before the military commission procedures could depart
from the procedures used in courts-martial. 52 Under Article 36(b)
the determination of impracticality is not one that the president
can make unilaterally. 53 According to the Court, the historical
reasons for the uniformity of procedures for military commissions
and courts-martial are two fold. 54 First, the difference between
military commissions and courts-martial was originally
jurisdiction alone, and such a difference would not justify a
separate set of procedural rules for each forum.55 Second, and
more importantly, uniformity was required to "protect against
abuse and ensure evenhandedness under the pressures of war."56
The Court held that there is nothing in the record to demonstrate
that it would be impractical to apply court-martial rules to
military commissions. 57 The Court further concluded that the
absence of any showing why the rules for courts-martial were
impractical was particularly disturbing in light of the clear and
admitted failure to apply one of the most fundamental protections
afforded by the Manual for Courts-Martial and the UCMJ - the
right of the accused to be present.58 Accordingly, the Court ruled
that the military commission procedures violated Article 36 of the
UCMJ.59
Not only did the military commission procedures established
by the president violate Article 36 of the UCMJ, they also violated
Article 21 of the UCMJ because the procedures relating to
protected information did not comply with the law of war. The
Court reasoned that, in order for military commissions under
Article 21 to have jurisdiction, they must comply with the law of
war.6 0 Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 is a
51. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2788-94.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 2790.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 2788.
57. Id. at 2792.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 2795-96.
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part of the law of war.6 1 Common Article 3 requires, among other
things, that the accused be tried by a regularly constituted court
affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples. 62 The Court did not precisely
define what the term "regularly constituted court" means under
Common Article 3 other than to indicate that it may likely exclude
special tribunals unless those tribunals incorporate recognized
principles governing the administration of justice.6 3  At a
minimum the Court held that in order for the military commission
procedures established by the president to qualify as regularly
constituted courts, any departures from the standards of the
military justice system must be justified by some practical need.64
Here, the Court said, such a justification was lacking. 65
In the Court's view, both Article 21 and Article 36 impose a
requirement that military commissions should apply the same
procedures as the UCMJ.6 6  If these military commission
procedures are established unilaterally by the president, and if
these procedures depart from the procedures for courts-martial,
some determination must be made as to why the courts-martial
procedures were impractical. According to the Court, the
president failed under both Article 21 and Article 36 of the UCMJ
to justify his departure.6 7 The Court seemed particularly troubled
when that departure would deny the accused the fundamental
right to be present at all of the proceedings against him.6 8
Implicit in the Court's opinion was the concern that the president
chose to authorize military commissions, not because of a
legitimate national security concern, but as a matter of
expedience. Throughout the majority opinion the Court reminds
and cautions the president that the military commission was not
"born of a desire to dispense a more summary form of justice than
is afforded by courts-martial. '6 9
61. Id. at 2794-97.
62. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 290.
63. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2796.
64. Id. at 2796-97.
65. Id. at 2797.
66. Id. at 2793.
67. Id. at 2797.
68. Id. at 2798.
69. Id. at 2788-93. As noted above, the compromise legislation did not
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III. HISTORY AND PRECEDENT: THE USE OF SECRET EVIDENCE IN THE
COURTS
At bottom, the Bush administration's argument for denying
terrorism suspects and their counsel access to confidential
information comes down to practicality-that there is no way, as a
practical matter, to prevent the disclosure of information critical
to national security. To be sure, the government has a compelling
interest in protecting information important to national security, 70
but it is not as though the practical aspects of achieving this
interest have not been explored by Congress, as well as the
military and civilian courts. In this Part, we discuss the ways in
which the Congress and the courts have approached the practical
issues surrounding the use of protected information and
constructed procedures to prevent the unwarranted disclosure of
protected information.
A. Under the CIPA and the UCMJ
There is no question that the Bush administration's proposal
for military commission procedures relating to protected
information departed significantly from the framework created by
the CIPA and the UCMJ. Both the statute and the military
regulations set out the specific requirements to which parties
must adhere if the government wishes to introduce classified
information or if the government wishes to assert a classified
evidence privilege. In this section, we discuss how the statute and
the military rule resolve the practical problems associated with
protected information that is classified, examine the details of the
statutory and regulatory requirements, and some illustrative
cases.
1. The CIPA and Protected Information
Congress enacted the CIPA in 1980 as a means to manage the
tension between a criminal defendant's right to discover classified
information prior to trial and introduce that information at trial,
approve the use of secret evidence in
trying terrorism suspects.
70. CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 175 (1985); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280,
307 (1981).
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and the government's legitimate interest in preventing the
disclosure of information related to national security. 71
Legislators designed the law to address a problem with so-called
"graymail" cases, in which defendants threatened to disclose
classified information at trial to force the government to dismiss
the case,72 and the statutory procedures govern the conduct of
pretrial conferences, the need for protective orders, and the steps
that may be taken when a defendant is entitled to the classified
information. 73
In particular, the CIPA outlines the standards for
determining when classified information will be discoverable and
admissible at trial. For discovery purposes, the defendant must
demonstrate that the information is more than theoretically
relevant and material. 74 If the defendant satisfies that standard,
the government may respond by requesting modification or
substitution of the information in question.75  Assuming the
government produces classified information in some form and the
defendant seeks to use the information at trial, the CIPA requires
a defendant to file a notice describing the information he
reasonably expects to be disclosed.76 When the government so
requests, the court must hold a hearing to determine whether the
information is useful, relevant or admissible. 77 The relevance and
admissibility inquiries are distinct from one another, and
governed by the standards contained in the Federal Rules of
Evidence. 7 8
If the court in fact concludes that certain information can be
used by the defendant, because it is relevant and admissible, the
government may seek simply to admit the relevant facts that the
71. See United States v. Dumeisi, 424 F.3d 566, 578 (7th Cir. 2005); see
also United States v. Rezaq, 134 F.3d 1121, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
72. See Note, supra note 2, at 1964 (discussing origins of the CIPA).
73. See 18 U.S.C.A App. III, §§ 2-4 (1980).
74. United States v. Libby, 429 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7-8 (D.D.C. 2006); United
States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 476 (4th Cir. 2004) (district court must
determine whether "the information the Government seeks to withhold is
material to the defense").
75. See 18 U.S.C.A App. III, § 4 (1980).
76. Id. at § 5(a).
77. Id. at § 6(a). The CIPA does not alter the standards by which
relevance is determined. See United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 1102, 1106
(4th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
78. United States v. Libby, 453 F. Supp. 2d 35, 36 (D.D.C. 2006).
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classified information would tend to prove, or substitute a
summary of the information. 79 The court may allow the summary
to be used only when it determines the summary will provide the
defendant "with substantially the same ability to make his
defense as would disclosure of the specified information."80 If, on
the other hand, the court denies the government's request to
stipulate or substitute, the government also may seek an
interlocutory appeal. 81 In the alternative, the government may
object to the disclosure of classified information, which effectively
requires dismissal of the case unless the government can prove
that the dismissal will not serve the interests of justice.8 2 If the
government can show that justice requires that the prosecution go
forward, the court may, among other things, dismiss particular
counts in the indictment, find against the United States on any
issue "to which the classified information relates," or strike or
preclude all or part of any witness's testimony. 83
The CIPA also gives the government significant authority to
close the trial proceedings to the public. 84  This additional
precaution gives the parties an additional ability to both protect
the legitimate national security interests of the United States
while ensuring that the defendant has access to relevant and
necessary classified evidence.
In short, the CIPA outlines a framework for addressing two
practical issues associated with protected information that is
considered classified: the defendant's need for information
relevant to his case, and the government's concern that classified
information related to national security not be casually disclosed.
The aim of the law is to ensure that prosecutions move forward
consonant with the principle that the government cannot
"undertake prosecution and then invoke its governmental
privileges to deprive the accused of anything which might be
79. 18 U.S.C.A. App. III, § 6(c); see Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 476
(discussing procedure once district court determines an item of classified
information is relevant and material).
80. 18 U.S.C.A. App. III, § 6(c)(1). See, e.g., United States v. Juan, 776
F.2d 256, 259 (11th Cir. 1985) (the court should determine whether the
government's alternative "will provide the defendant with his defense").
81. 18 U.S.C.A. App. III, § 7.
82. Id. at § 6(e).
83. Id.
84. Id. at § 6(a).
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material to his defense. '85 Accordingly, the statute ultimately
compels the government to choose between disclosing the
information in question or forgoing prosecution of the defendant:
even when justice requires that the indictment not be dismissed,
the government will not be allowed to proceed as if the defendant's
legitimate interest were rendered null.8 6 The constitutionality of
forcing this choice upon the government has been upheld in
numerous cases.
87
a. Illustrative Cases
The federal courts have addressed the requirements of the
CIPA in many cases; here, we discuss a few that illustrate
particularly well the way in which the statute's design serves to
protect the government's interest in limiting the disclosure of
protected information. Consider, first, United States v. Yunis. 88
There, the defendant had been indicted, for crimes arising out of
the hijacking of a Royal Jordanian Airlines flight in 1985,
including air piracy, conspiracy, and hostage taking.89  The
defendant sought discovery of fourteen transcripts of taped
conversations between himself and a government informant,
Jamal Hamdan. 90 The United States District Court concluded
that the transcripts at issue should be produced, and the
government appealed that determination. 91
In reversing the District Court, the Court of Appeals in Yunis
clarified the requirements of the CIPA in respect to discovery
requests that implicate classified information. First, the
defendant must demonstrate that the information sought is
relevant to his defense. 92 The court must next determine whether
the government's claim of privilege is at least colorable; as the
court observed, "the government cannot be permitted to convert
any run-of-the-mine criminal case into a CIPA action merely by
85. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 671 (1957).
86. United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 474-76 (4th Cir. 2004).
87. See Note, supra note 2, at 1966.
88. 867 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
89. See id. at 619; for a full description of the circumstances of the
hijacking, see United States v. Yunis, 859 F.2d 953, 954-57 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
90. See Yunis, 867 F.2d at 619.
91. See id. at 620-21.
92. Id. at 623.
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frivolous claims of privilege. '93 In making this determination, the
court must consider not just the substance of the information at
issue - such as the content of conversations - but the tactical
value that attaches to the way in which the information was
obtained, from which foreign counterintelligence agents might
learn a great deal about the nation's intelligence-gathering
capabilities. 94
Neither the substance nor the tactical value of the
information automatically precludes its discovery and disclosure
under the CIPA. So long as the defendant can show that the
information he seeks is in fact relevant and material, the
information should be deemed discoverable consistent with
appropriate limitations upon its further disclosure. The Yunis
court held that relevance and materiality in this context must
refer to more than mere theoretical relevance; rather, the district
court should rule the protected information discoverable only if it
"is at least helpful to the defense of [the] accused. '95 On the facts
of Yunis, and following an in camera review of the protected
information at issue, the court concluded that because the
information did not go "to the innocence of the defendant vel non,"
and could not serve to impeach "any evidence of guilt, or make[]
more or less probable any fact at issue in establishing any defense
to the charges," it arguably could not be considered relevant, much
less beneficial to his case. 96
These discovery standards were applied more recently in
United States v. Libby (Libby 1).97 In that case, the government
charged the defendant with obstruction of justice, making false
statements and perjury resulting from his statements regarding
an intelligence agent's identity.98  The defendant sought all
documents provided him in connection with certain intelligence
93. Id. The government privilege to withhold classified information has
long been recognized. See, e.g., C. & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333
U.S. 103, 111 (1948).
94. Yunis, 867 F.2d at 623.
95. Id. (quotation omitted).
96. Id. at 624. Because the court viewed the protected information as
neither relevant nor material, it declined to review how the balance should be
struck between the defendant's interest in disclosure and the government's
interest in non-disclosure. See id. at 625.
97. 429 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2006).
98. Id. at 4.
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briefings, as well as documents relating to inquiries he made in
connection with intelligence briefings. 99  On the question of
materiality of the information sought, the court undertook a close
examination of the purposes to which the defendant claimed he
would put that information as well as the nature of the
information itself.100 The defendant argued that the information
was necessary for him to negate the specific intent element of the
charged offenses; the court did not dispute that information that
would tend to demonstrate a lack of specific intent ought to be
considered relevant and material because it would be helpful to
the defense. 101 But the court also concluded that such information
need not be provided in its raw form, because the material portion
could be provided him in a form sufficient to be helpful, but which
would not disclose more information than necessary to that end. 10 2
Just as Libby I illustrates the steps a court can take to both
assess relevance and materiality and make provisions to limit
disclosure to information that satisfies that assessment, another
relatively recent case, United States v. Moussaoui,10 3 shows the
flexibility under the CIPA in circumstances in which a defendant
has a genuine need for protected information and the government
nonetheless refuses to disclose. In Moussaoui, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit addressed the procedures
that should be followed when a court has determined that a
defendant has shown both relevance and materiality in respect to
testimony from witnesses (in Moussaoui, enemy combatants)
whom the government, for national security reasons, cannot
produce. 1 04
The court concluded that the defendant, charged with
conspiracy related to the attacks of September 11, 2001, had made
a plausible showing that testimony from certain witnesses was
99. Id. at 8.
100. See id. at 13-14.
101. Id. at 12-13.
102. See id. at 15.
103. 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004).
104. See id. at 471-72. The court discussed the matter in light of CIPA's
requirements while acknowledging that CIPA technically did not control. Id.
at 471 n.20 ("Like the district court ..., we believe that CIPA provides a
useful framework for considering the questions raised by Moussaoui's request
for access to enemy combatant witnesses.").
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material to his defense. 10 5 The court then observed that, pursuant
to the CIPA and the cases decided thereunder,
the appropriate procedure [was] for the district court to
order production of the evidence or witness and leave to
the Government the choice of whether to comply with
that order. If the government refuses to produce the
information at issue - as it may properly do - the result
is ordinarily dismissal. 106
Having determined that the enemy combatant witnesses
could offer material testimony essential to Moussaoui's defense,
the district court concluded and the Fourth Circuit affirmed that
the choice was the government's whether to comply with the order
to afford the defendant access to the witnesses, or to suffer a
sanction. 107
Because the government refused to produce the witnesses, the
court considered whether an alternative procedure would suffice -
one that would "neither disadvantage[] the defendant nor
penalize[U the government (and the public) for protecting classified
information that may be vital to national security."108 In devising
an alternative, the court focused on two questions: whether there
existed any appropriate substitute for the witnesses' testimony,
and whether, absent such a substitute, another remedy would be
appropriate. 109 The CIPA requires that any substitute must place
the defendant in as close to the position he would have been in
had the classified information been made available.1 10
The Moussaoui court concluded that there was no need to
consider alternative remedies given that a substitution could be
made: the court held specifically that certain summaries of
witness testimony would provide "an adequate basis for the
creation of written statements that [could] be submitted to the
jury in lieu of the witnesses' deposition testimony."11  The court
notably held that the creation of the substitution statements
105. Id. at 473-74.
106. Id. at 474.
107. Id. at 476.
108. Id. at 477.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 479.
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should be an "interactive process among the parties and the
district court," including identification by defense counsel of those
portions of the summaries that the defendant would want to admit
into evidence at trial.112 As well, the court made clear that the
jury would have to be provided with sufficient information
regarding the substitutions to understand their origins. 113
Finally, consider the second go-around in the Libby case
(Libby Il),114 in which the District Court addressed the CIPA
requirements regarding disclosure of protected information at
trial. In addressing the question of admissibility, the court noted
that Congress did not intend by the enactment of the CIPA to
"alter the rules governing the admissibility of evidence during a
trial" under the Federal Rules of Evidence. 115 The government
nonetheless argued that, when evidence involves matters of
national security, the court must look beyond relevance to
determine whether the information at issue would at least aid the
defendant's case.11 6 This is nearly identical to the test courts have
used to determine materiality at the discovery stage - and,
indeed, was the test the court had applied in Libby 1.117
The court found that the clear language of the statute and the
legislative history provided no basis for concluding that any
heightened relevance and admissibility standard should apply to
classified information at the trial stage. 118 As the court observed,
"[w]hile there is no doubt a governmental interest in protecting
national security and classified information under the CIPA, the .
. . balancing of the government's interests against the defendant's
interest [is] properly employed during the discovery process.""19
Indeed, the CIPA accounts for the continuing vitality of the
government's interest by allowing for the substitution or redaction
of documents to protect information from disclosure, and by
allowing the government to preclude entirely the introduction of
such information. 120 While the latter option may require the case
112. Id. at 480.
113. Id.
114. United States v. Libby, 453 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D.D.C. 2006).
115. See id. at 39.
116. Id. at 40.
117. Id. at 41.
118. Id. at 42.
119. Id. at 43.
120. See 18 U.S.C.A. App. III, § 6(c).
2007] THE CASE AGAINST SECRET EVIDENCE
be dismissed, " '[t]he burden is the Government's . . . to decide
whether the public prejudice of allowing the crime to go
unpunished is greater than that attendant upon the possible
disclosure of state secrets and other confidential information in
the Government's possession."'12
What these cases demonstrate is that the handling of
protected information relevant to national security is not beyond
the capacity of lawyers and judges. The CIPA sets out rules
governing the discovery of such information and its admissibility
at trial and provides great flexibility to the government in
accommodating the defense's need for protected information when
it is relevant and material. That the government may have to
choose in some cases to refuse to disclose any information and
thereby forgo the prosecution is one that Congress has deemed
appropriate; that the government must make that choice is
consistent with the long-standing determination that defendants
in fairness must have access to information adequate to mount an
appropriate defense to criminal charges, regardless of the
provenance of that information, and regardless of its connection to
national security.
2. The UCMJ and Protected Evidence
Military courts, like Article III courts, have wrestled with the
use of secret evidence in the courts-martial context. Like their
Article III court counterparts, the military system has struck a
balance between protecting national security interests and the
protection of individual rights. Before discussing the specific rules
and some illustrative cases, we briefly examine the tradition from
which the current military system emerged. Interestingly, this
tradition is one in which individual rights have often taken
precedence over the protection of national security interests -
even when the risks caused by a disclosure of secret evidence to
national security have been far from speculative. This history is
best reflected in three cases that arose in the years following
World War II, during the height of the cold war with the Soviet
Union.
In the first case, United States v. Dobr,122 the accused was
121. Libby, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 43 (quotations omitted).
122. 21 C.M.R 451 (1956).
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tried for desertion and convicted of the lesser offense of absence
without official leave (AWOL).123 Prior to his enlistment in the
military in 1954, the accused was a member of the
Czechoslovakian Army and after escaping into Germany he had
served as a civilian employee of the American Intelligence
Agency. 124
Before the trial began, military officials told the accused's
defense counsel that he would be restricted from viewing his
client's government file for the period in which the client served as
an employee of the American Intelligence Agency. 125 They also
told the defense attorney that at trial he could only introduce
evidence that his client was employed by the American
Intelligence Agency and that he had access to classified
information. 126 They further ordered defense counsel not to make
any argument or present any motion at trial that would indicate
the availability of information regarding the accused's
activities. 127
On appeal, the defense claimed that these restrictions denied
him the effective assistance of counsel and violated fundamental
due process requirements. 28 The Army Board of Review agreed
and reversed the conviction. 129 The court held that the secret
evidence contained in the accused's government files might be
relevant in two ways: first, to show that the accused performed
valuable and loyal service to his country which would counter
allegations that he intended to desert the Army; 130 and second, at
sentencing, evidence in the accused's secret file might contain
mitigating information such as evidence of bravery, or other good
conduct. 131  The court made these relevancy determinations
without actually reviewing the accused's confidential file.
The court noted the tension between protecting national
security information and ensuring the rights of the accused to a
123. Id. at 453.
124. Id. at 454.
125. Id. at 453.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 455.
130. Id. at 454.
131. Id.
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fair trial. 132  The court concluded that when testimony or
documents involve classified information and are relevant to any
issue, either for the prosecution or the defense, the government
must elect either to permit the introduction of classified evidence
or abandon the prosecution. 133  This standard, which favors
disclosure, is even more significant when one considers the context
of this case. First, though the court assumed that the accused's
files contained relevant evidence, it never conducted an in camera
or other review of the files. Second, since the accused had not
been found guilty of desertion, the only issue at trial to which the
classified information would have been relevant was determining
an appropriate sentence for the relatively minor offense of AWOL.
Finally, there is little doubt that the accused's file detailing his
work with the American Intelligence Agency likely would have
revealed classified operations, classified means and methods used
by agents, as well as the identity of other classified agents,
counter-agents, and organizations directly affecting U.S. national
security interests in relation to the Soviet Union and other
Warsaw Pact countries. Nonetheless, the court ruled in favor of
disclosure.
The next case, United States v. Nichols,134 decided in 1957 by
the court of military appeals, which at that time was the highest
court of review within the military system. In Nichols, the
accused, who was a member of the Counter Intelligence Corps,
was charged with a number of offenses related to improper
dealings with subordinates and misuse of government
resources. 135 The investigation file and the charges against the
accused were classified. 136 The accused retained civilian counsel
and the government denied that counsel access to the information
and precluded him from representing his client during the
preliminary hearing. 13 7 Prior to trial, the government declassified
and made available virtually all of the case file and the charge
sheet.138 On appeal the defense contended that the accused had
132. Id. at 455.
133. Id.
134. 23 C.M.R 343 (1957).
135. Id. at 346.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 347.
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been denied the right to the counsel of his choice at the
preliminary hearing and that it was unfair for the government to
place the burden on the accused and his defense counsel to obtain
the necessary security clearance. 139 The court agreed with the
defense and reversed the conviction. 140
The court held that under the UCMJ the accused has the
right to a civilian counsel of his choice. 141 Because the UCMJ does
not place any limitations on that counsel with respect to the
attorney's security clearance, the right to counsel cannot be
limited by service-imposed obligations that the counsel obtain a
security clearance. 142 In essence, like the court in Dobr, the court
here struck the balance in favor of the soldier's individual rights
over the need to protect national security interests.
The third case from this era, United States v. Reyes, 143
involved an airman who was charged with among other crimes,
damaging national defense material with the intent to interfere
with the national defense of the United States. 144 Specifically, the
accused was charged with and convicted of cutting several
electrical wires on a B-52 aircraft he was assigned to guard. 145
In order to prove the accused's intent to interfere with the
national security of the United States, the government introduced
a witness who testified the aircraft in question was part of the
emergency war order, and that the aircraft was in a "cocked"
status at the time the accused cut the wires. 146 This status
required the aircraft to be ready to deploy in short notice up to the
maximum range of the aircraft's capacity. 147  On cross-
examination the military defense attorney asked the witness in
general terms the nature of the aircraft's mission and the distance
the aircraft would be expected to fly.148 The president of the panel
and the law officer precluded the defense attorney from asking
139. Id. at 348-49.
140. Id. at 350.
141. Id. at 349.
142. Id.
143. 30 C.M.R. 776 (1960).
144. Id. at 780.
145. Id. at 781.
146. Id. at 784.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 784-85.
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these questions because the aircraft's mission was "top secret."149
On appeal the Air Force Board of review ruled that it was
reversible error to prevent the defense from questioning the
witness about evidence which the government had made relevant
by its line of questioning. 150  The court held that once the
relevancy and admissibility of the evidence has been established,
the government must chose between permitting the evidence to be
introduced or withdrawing the charges to which the evidence
relates. 151
In each of these cases, the national security interests were
both obvious and tangible. Disclosure of the classified information
could have resulted in revealing the identity of secret agents and
counter agents, providing information as to the methods and
means used to gather intelligence information, exposing secret
programs, and disclosing top secret war plans and strategic
aircraft capabilities. All three military appeals courts ruled that
the interests of the accused to present relevant evidence in
mitigation, to be represented by the counsel of his choice in a
preliminary hearing, and to effectively cross examine a
government witness, outweighed the national security interests at
issue. It is from this tradition that the current military rules and
case law on secret evidence emerged.
a. Requirements of the Code
The military first codified rules on the treatment of classified
evidence when the president signed the executive order
establishing the military rules of evidence (MRE) in 1980.152
Contained within the new military rules of evidence is Rule
505,153 which sets out the procedures for classified information in
the context of a court-martial. MRE 505 is similar to the CIPA
enacted by Congress that same year; MRE 505 was based on the
version of CIPA sponsored by the administration. 154  The
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 787.
152. Executive Order No. 12,198. 45 Fed. Reg. 16, 931 (1980).
153. MIL. R. EVID. 505.
154. Major Christopher Maher, The Right to at Fair Trial in Criminal
Cases Involving the Introduction of Classified Information, 120 MIL. L. REV.
83, 102 (1988).
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balancing of interests between the defendant's right to discover
and present classified information and the government's interests
in protecting classified information, as well as the problem of
"grey mail" were the concerns of MRE 505.
MRE 505 begins by defining classified information in the
same way that the term is defined under CIPA. 155 MRE 505 then
sets out various procedural rules related to classified evidence.
The procedural rules differ depending on where the case is in the
court-martial process. The rules also outline the standards for
determining when classified information will be discoverable and
admissible at trial. This process and the standards differ
somewhat from the procedures and standards under CIPA.
At the initial stages before the case has been referred for trial,
the government has the maximum ability to restrict or prevent
the disclosure of classified evidence. If the defense requests
discovery of classified information, the court-martial convening
authority can delete specific items of classified information, 156
substitute a portion or summary of the classified information, 157
substitute a statement admitting the relevant facts that the
classified evidence would tend to prove, 158 or provide the classified
information subject to conditions that will guard against the
compromise of the information. 159 If the convening authority
believes that none of these actions will prevent identifiable
damage to national security, he can also simply withhold
disclosure of the requested information. 160
Once the case has been referred to trial, the convening
authority no longer has the absolute ability to prevent the
155. MIL. R. EVID. 505(b)(1). Classified information is: any information or
material that has been determined by the United States Government
pursuant to an executive order, statute, or regulations, to require protection
against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national security, and any
restricted data as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 2014(y). 42 U.S.C. § 2014(y) defines
restricted data as "all data concerning (1) design, manufacture, or utilization
of atomic weapons; (2) the production of special nuclear material; or (3) the
use of special nuclear material in the production of energy, but shall not
include data declassified or removed from the Restricted Data category
pursuant to section 2162 of this title."
156. MIL. R. EVID. 505(d)(1).
157. Id. at (d)(2).
158. Id. at (d)(3).
159. Id. at (d)(4).
160. Id. at (d)(5).
2007] THE CASE AGAINST SECRET EVIDENCE 799
disclosure of classified information. In the discovery phase, if the
defense requests the disclosure of classified information, they
must first demonstrate that the evidence is relevant and
necessary to an element of the offense or a legally cognizable
defense and is otherwise admissible in evidence in the court-
martial. 1 1 Once the request is made the convening authority has
one of four options.
The convening authority can direct the disclosure of the
classified information to the defense. 16 2 If the government elects
to disclose the information, they can place certain protective
orders on the defense to protect the information from
unauthorized disclosure.163
The second option for the government is to request limited
disclosure. 16 4 Under this option the government must provide
information to the military judge in an in camera and ex parte
proceeding. 16 5 So long as the classified information itself is not
necessary to enable the accused to prepare for trial, the military
judge can allow for any of the following limits on disclosure:
deletion of specified items of classified information from the
information disclosed to the defense; substitution of a portion or
summary of the information for the classified documents; or the
substitution of relevant facts that the classified information would
tend to prove. 166
At trial, if the defense requests production of prior statements
made by the witness, and those statements contain classified
information, the government can seek to have the military judge
excise portions of the prior statement before disclosure to the
defense if the prior statement is consistent with the witness's in-
court testimony. 167 If the prior statements are inconsistent with
the witness's in-court testimony, then the military judge can order
the disclosure of the classified portions of the prior statements. 168
In lieu of full disclosure the government can either proffer a
161. Id. at (f).
162. Id. at (g).
163. Id. at (g)(1).
164. Id. at (g)(2).
165. Id. at (g)(2)(C).
166. Id. (g)(2).
167. Id. at (g)(3)(B).
168. Id. at (i)(4)(B).
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statement admitting relevant facts that the witness's prior
inconsistent statement would tend to prove or submit a portion or
summary to be used in lieu of the classified information. 16 9 If the
military judge determines that providing the classified portion of
the prior inconsistent statement to the defense is necessary to
afford the accused a fair trial, then no alternatives to full
disclosure will suffice. 170
The government's third option to a defense discovery request
for classified information is to dismiss the charges against the
accused and avoid disclosing the classified information. 171 The
final option for the government is to dismiss those charges and
specifications to which the classified information relates. 172 This
option also allows the government to avoid disclosing the classified
information at the cost of forgoing a criminal prosecution on the
charges to which the classified evidence relates.
If the government does provide classified evidence in some
form to the defense at the discovery stage and the defense later
seeks to use the information at trial, MRE 505 requires the
defense to provide notice to the government of the information it
reasonably expects to disclose. 173 If the government requests, the
military judge must hold an in camera hearing to determine if the
information which the defense seeks to introduce is relevant and
necessary to an element of the offense or a legally cognizable
defense and is otherwise admissible in evidence. 174
If the military judge determines that the information which
the defense seeks to introduce is relevant and necessary, then the
government has three options. First the government can
withdraw its objection and allow for the evidence to be
disclosed. 175 In order to more fully protect the information the
government can also proffer a statement admitting for the
purposes of the proceeding any relevant facts such classified
information would tend to prove. 176 The government can also
submit a portion or summary to be used in lieu of the classified
169. Id. at (i)(4)(D).
170. Id.
171. Id. at (f)(2).
172. Id. at (f)(3).
173. Id. at (f)(2)-(3).
174. Id. at (i)(4)(B).
175. Id. at (i)(4)(D).
176. Id.
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information. 17 7 If the military judge determines that providing
the classified portion of the prior inconsistent statement to the
defense is necessary to afford the accused a fair trial, then no
alternatives to full disclosure will suffice. 178
The third option for the government is to continue to object to
the disclosure of classified information.1 7 9 Faced with continued
government refusals to disclose information, the military judge is
authorized to impose any order that the interests of justice
require. 180 Orders can include, striking or precluding all or part of
a witness's testimony; 181 declaring a mistrial; 8 2 finding against
the government on any issue to which the classified evidence is
relevant and material; 183 dismissing the charges with or without
prejudice; 184 or dismissing the charges or specifications to which
the classified information relates.185
In sum, MRE 505, like the CIPA, outlines a framework for
addressing the two practical issues associated with protected
information that is considered classified: the defendant's need for
information relevant to his case, and the government's concern
that classified information related to national security not be
casually disclosed. MRE 505, in most aspects, strikes the very
same balance Congress struck under the CIPA. One of the few
differences in the two provisions is the standard that the defense
must meet in order to obtain discovery of classified information.
Under the CIPA, the defendant must show that the evidence in
relevant and material. Under MRE 505, by contrast, the defense
must show that the evidence is relevant and necessary to an
element of the offense or a legally cognizable defense and is
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at (i)(4)(E). MRE '505 does not specifically provide the
government with the right to file an interlocutory appeal of a judge's decision
ordering disclosure of classified evidence. Rule for courts-martial 908
specifically provides the government the ability to appeal a military judge's
order that either directs the disclosure of classified information or imposes
sanctions for the nondisclosure of classified information. See Rule for Courts-
Martial 908(a).
180. MIL. R. EVID. 505(i)(4)(E).
181. Id. at (i)(4)(E)(i).
182. Id. at (i)(4)(E)(ii).
183. Id. at (i)(4)(E)(iii).
184. Id. at (i)(4)(E)(iv).
185. Mil. R. Evid. 505(i)(4)(E)(v).
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otherwise admissible in evidence. MRE 505's standard is more
difficult to meet because even at the discovery stage the defense
must demonstrate that the classified information is admissible.
What is important for purposes of this Article is that while
the CIPA and MRE 505 strike the balance slightly differently,
both provisions recognize that a balance between individual rights
and the protection of classified information must be reached - the
aim of both laws is to ensure that prosecutions move forward
consonant with the principle that the government cannot
"undertake prosecution and then invoke its governmental
privileges to deprive the accused of anything that might be
material to his defense."86 Both provisions ultimately compel the
government to choose between disclosing the information in
question and forgoing prosecution of the defendant.
In addition to these procedures, MRE 505 also gives the
military judge significant authority to close the trial proceedings
to the public. 187 This additional precaution gives the parties an
additional ability to both protect the legitimate national security
interests of the United States while ensuring that the accused has
access to relevant and necessary classified evidence.
a. Illustrative Cases
Unlike the Article III courts, there have been relatively few
reported cases since the adoption of MRE 505 that have required
the military courts to interpret or work through the provisions of
this rule of evidence. Two cases post-MRE 505 do illustrate some
of the workings of this rule in the military context.
The first and, most significant case is United States v.
Lonetree.18 8 Sergeant Lonetree was a marine assigned at one time
to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, and later to the U.S. Embassy in
Vienna.18 9 While on duty at these locations agents of the Soviet
Union contacted Lonetree and he eventually passed confidential
information to them. 190 He was tried and convicted by a military
panel of a number of offenses including espionage and conspiracy
186. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 671 (1957).
187. MIL. R. EVID. 505(i)(1)-(4).
188. 35 M.J. 396 (C.M.A. 1992).
189. Id. at 399.
190. Id.
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to commit espionage. 191
At his trial the government sought to corroborate certain
aspects of the case against Sergeant Lonetree by calling a witness
who had knowledge of the identity of Soviet agents. 192 The
government moved to allow the witness to testify under a
pseudonym. 193 The government also moved to prevent the defense
from discovering the witnesses real name and questioning the
witness about his background during cross examination.1 94 After
an in camera and ex parte review of the government's motion, the
military judge granted the request.195  On appeal Sergeant
Lonetree claimed that the military judge's restriction on his access
to evidence and the limits placed on cross examination violated his
6th Amendment right to confrontation.196
The Court of Military Appeals rejected Sergeant Lonetree's
argument based on the court's analysis of applicable Supreme
Court decisions and MRE 505.197 The court recognized that while
the accused has a Sixth Amendment right to inquire into the
background of the witnesses, the right is not unlimited. 198
Protection of the witness' safety is one legitimate reason for
denying the accused access to this information. 199 A denial does
not violate the accused's Sixth Amendment right if there is a
legitimate basis for the limitation and withholding the
information does not prevent the accused from placing the witness
in his proper setting.2 0 0 Here the court determined that the
accused was still able to place the witness in his proper setting.201
According to the court " the real world setting and environment of
John Doe at the time of this trial and of all events about which he
testified is better reflected in his pseudonym and in his
identification as an intelligence agent than in anything connected
191. Id.
192. Id. at 405.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 405-10.
198. Id. at 407.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 410.
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with his true identity. ' 202 Accordingly, the excluded evidence
lacked the relevant and necessary value under MRE 505 which
would have required its disclosure.20 3
The second and more recent case, United States v. Schmidt,20 4
concerned the government's attempt to establish a procedure to
screen all classified information which the accused had obtained
in his official duties before the information was passed by the
accused to his civilian defense counsel.20 5  The ,government
contended that MRE 505(h)(1) required such a procedure because
the rule requires the accused to provide notice to the government
if he intends to disclose classified material "in any manner in
connection with a court-martial proceeding. '206
The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces dispensed with
that argument in a per curiam opinion. The court noted that the
civilian defense counsel had the requisite security clearance. 20 7
MRE 505(h)(1)'s notice requirement is not applicable in this
context. According to the court, "the rule does not come into play
when the defense is making a preliminary evaluation of the
evidence it already possesses to determine what evidence, if any,
it may seek to disclose. '208 The court also expressed concern over
how the requirements which the government sought to impose
would affect the attorney-client relationship. 20 9 The government's
approach would have required the accused without the benefit of
his own counsel to engage in adversarial litigation with opposing
counsel as a precondition to discussing relevant information with
his attorney.
Both of these cases are instructive examples of how military
courts have applied MRE 505. The cases demonstrate a military
court's ability to accommodate the interests of the government in
protecting classified information while protecting the rights of the
accused to a fair trial. The opinions reflect a pragmatic, fact-
based resolution of complex issues. In Lonetree, for example, the
court recognized that the accused may not be entitled to all of the
202. Id. (quotation omitted).
203. Id.
204. 60 M.J. 1 (2004).
205. Id. at 2.
206. MIL. R. EVID. 505(h)(1).
207. Schmidt, 60 M.J at 2.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 2-3.
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possible relevant information about the government's witness.
That interest is tempered by other legitimate concerns including
the government's need to protect classified information. Even
here it is important to note that the accused was not banned
absolutely from access to information. He was allowed and, in
fact, did conduct a thorough cross examination of the "John Doe"
witness, and it is equally clear that, had that limited cross-
examination not sufficiently placed the witness in his proper
setting, or had the excluded evidence been relevant and necessary
to the defense, the court would have required the government
under MRE 505 to elect between disclosing the information or
dismissing the charges.
Likewise, in Schmidt, the court did not employ a literal
reading of MRE 505(h)(1). 210 The court recognized that such a
reading would be both impractical and unfair.211 Yet the court did
not give the accused a blank check to disclose classified evidence.
He was merely permitted to disclose classified evidence he had
obtained in the course of his duties to his civilian defense counsel
who had the requisite security clearance. 212 That disclosure was
for the limited purpose of allowing the accused and his attorney to
make a preliminary evaluation of the evidence and no disclosure
outside of the attorney-client relationship was authorized. 213
These cases aptly demonstrate that military courts, like their
Article III counterparts, are capable of handling protected
information relevant to national security.
B. Outside the National Security Context
Though it is in the context of trying terrorism suspects that
the question of how to limit the unnecessary disclosure of
protected information while ensuring that defendants are fairly
tried is raised most directly, there are relevant examples of how
the practical problems associated with protected information may
be addressed outside the national security context. In Davis v.
Alaska,214 for instance, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that a
210. Id. at 2.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 2-3.
213. Id. at 2.
214. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
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statute making a witness's juvenile court record presumptively
confidential violated the defendant's right to conduct cross-
examination under the Confrontation Clause. 215  The Court
elaborated on this holding in the due process context in
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie.216
In Ritchie, the Court addressed the question whether a state's
interest in the confidentiality of investigative files concerning
child abuse trumped a defendant's constitutional right to discover
favorable evidence. 217 The case involved a defendant's request for
records relating to the victim in the possession of Pennsylvania's
department of Children and Youth Services.218 The legislature
had deemed the information contained in the CYS investigative
files confidential subject to certain exceptions, including one for
disclosure pursuant to a court order.219  The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court had held, among other things, that the defendant,
through his lawyer, had a constitutional right to examine the
contents of the records at issue and that the failure to disclose the
CYS file violated the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of compulsory
process.220
The Court concluded, first, that this claim was best
considered by reference to due process. 221 And, under due process,
"[i]t is well settled that the government has the obligation to turn
over evidence in its possession that is both favorable to the
accused and material to guilt or punishment. '222 "Vateriality,"
moreover, refers to the "reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. '223
The Commonwealth argued that no inquiry into materiality
was required on these facts because of its overriding interest in
confidentiality - particularly when the defendant had no more
than a belief that the files might contain information relevant to
his defense. The Court recognized that the public interest in
215. Id. at 318-20.
216. 480 U.S. 39 (1987).
217. Id. at 42-43.
218. Id. at 43.
219. See id. at 43-44.
220. Id. at 55.
221. See id. at 56.
222. Id. at 57.
223. Id. (quotation omitted).
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ensuring the confidentiality of information related to child abuse
is indeed strong;224 but the Commonwealth had not granted such
information absolute immunity from disclosure in criminal cases,
and the Court reasoned that, when otherwise confidential records
contain information relevant and material to the defendant's case,
it must be disclosed. 225
That said, the Court did not ignore the Commonwealth's
important interest in limiting the scope of disclosure of cabining
its effect. The Court noted that a defendant's right to discover
exculpatory evidence does not "include the unsupervised authority
to search-through the Commonwealth's files. '226 Rather, settled
practice - reflecting the government's practical concern in limiting
disclosure of confidential information - indicated that the
defendant's interest in securing information relevant and material
to his defense could be fully protected by the trial court's in
camera review of the records in question.227 If a defendant knows
of specific information contained within the government's
otherwise confidential records, he may request that from the court
and argue that such information is relevant and material to his
defense. 228
As Ritchie demonstrates, the Article III courts have developed
procedures for handling protected information in the context of
criminal proceedings - procedures developed outside an explicit
statutory framework like the CIPA, and which indicate that the
courts are competent to manage sensitive information in the
context of criminal litigation. The Ritchie court in particular
recognized the general rule that a defendant must be afforded
access to all relevant and material exculpatory information. The
importance of that interest does not favor unlimited disclosure,
but rather initial review by the trial court in camera, with a report
to defense counsel and the defendant about potentially
exculpatory information that the defense may then argue should
be produced because of its relevance and materiality. In this way
224. See id. at 60 (noting that it "is essential that the child have a state-
designated person to whom he may turn, and to do so with the assurance of
confidentiality").
225. See id. at 58.
226. Id. at 59.
227. Id. at 60.
228. See id.
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the balance is struck between the government's practical concern
to control disclosure of the information and the criminal
defendant's unquestioned interest in access to information that
may prove useful in challenging the government's case against
him.
C. There Exist Ample Models Addressing the Practical Concerns
Associated with Protected Information
As this discussion shows, there are ample models in both the
military and federal systems for managing potential evidence that
raises national security concerns. The CIPA and Military Rule
505 reflect the required balancing and correctly place the onus on
the government to make a choice in respect to the practicality of
keeping protected information from disclosure. These
arrangements are not inapposite in the terrorism context; there
the government faces precisely the same choices as in other
contexts, and likewise maintains control over the information in
question. The practical concerns, in short, may be addressed by
reference to one of the models we have discussed in this Part.
That the Bush administration, in the face of these models, still
claimed impracticality suggests that other concerns motivated its
secret evidence proposals.
IV. THE LEGITIMACY OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S RATIONALES
If the administration's reasons for placing severe restrictions
on the defense's access to protected information in respect to
terrorism suspects detained as enemy combatants are not justified
in light of the proven ability of the courts to manage such
information in criminal trials, the question remains: what was at
the heart of the administration's decision to opt for such
restrictive measures? As stated earlier, even after Hamdan and
the passage of the military commissions act, which ultimately
reached a fairer compromise on the use of protected information,
this remains an important question. In the dynamic enterprise of
national security policy making, it is far from clear that today's
compromise will hold. In this Part, we explore the possible
reasons underlying the administration's preference for secret
evidence, the legitimacy of those reasons, and the potential
consequences of endorsing the use of secret evidence in cases
involving our own forces at courts-martial, and ordinary criminal
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defendants in Article III courts. We conclude that the
administration's reasons for using secret evidence lack legitimacy
and we propose amendments to Article 36 of the UCMJ to better
ensure that Congress serves its constitutional role as a check on
executive power.
A. Possible Underlying Rationales
The administration's underlying rationales for its treatment
of protected information in military tribunals fall into three broad
categories. First, the use of secret evidence is warranted because
the legal status of the unlawful enemy combatants is different
from other individuals. Second, because of the terrorist activities
in which the unlawful enemy combatants allegedly engaged, they
should be treated differently. Finally, unless the rules for using
protected evidence in military tribunals are relaxed, the
protections typically provided to defendants in a criminal trial or a
court-martial will prevent the government from obtaining
convictions. These rationales reflect potential policy
determinations based not upon national security concerns, but
upon the legal and factual identities of the terrorism suspects and
upon their alleged actions. 229 Of course, if we were to accept these
reasons as legitimate bases for providing them less protection
through the use of secret evidence, then we have taken a
significant step down a very slippery slope.
The first rationale that might explain the administration's
position regarding protected information is the legal status of the
terrorism suspects detained as enemy combatants. Initially, the
administration's view was that members of Al Qaeda and other
enemy combatants did not enjoy the protections of Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. 230  While the
229. See, e.g., Transcript of Interview of Vice President Dick Cheney on
"Meet the Press," Sunday September 14, 2003. The Vice President stated:
"[I]n a sense, sort of the theme that comes through repeatedly for me is that
9/11 changed everything. It changed the way we think about threats to the
United States. It changed about our recognition of our vulnerabilities. It
changed in terms of the kind of national security strategy we need to pursue,
in terms of guaranteeing the safety and security of the American people."
Available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3080244/.
230. Press Release, Office of the White House Press Secretary, Statement
by the Press Secretary on the Geneva Convention (May 7, 2003), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030507-18.html.
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administration's stated policy was to treat these unlawful enemy
combatants consistent with the spirit of the Geneva
Conventions, 231 the administration had the power to decide just
how close to the spirit of Geneva that treatment would fall. The
Supreme Court rejected this position in Hamdan.232 The Court
held that Congress, by statute, had determined that Common
Article 3 did, in fact, apply to these enemy combatants brought
before military tribunals. 233 In other words, the Court concluded
that, by operation of Article 21 of the UCMJ, the detainees did not
have a legal status falling outside the provisions of Common
Article 3.
The significant point for this discussion is that, even if the
Court had upheld the administration's position in Hamdan and
found the status of these enemy combatants to be legally unique,
the question remains why that different legal status should result
in less access to and use of protected information. Assume, for
example, that Congress were to amend the UCMJ to exempt these
enemy combatants from the protections of Common Article 3.
Given the proven ability of judges and lawyers to balance the
legitimate interests of national security against the rights of a
defendant in a criminal trial, one could reasonably conclude that
the judges sitting on military tribunals would be equally capable
of striking a similar balance; as a practical matter, the legal
status of the defendant is immaterial to the protected evidence
inquiry. At a minimum, the government ought to make some
showing that the difference in legal status would be meaningful in
the context of the determinations the tribunals would have to
make. The government has not made that showing, relying
instead upon the simple assertion that a difference in legal status
is meaningful in the context of a tribunal's determination of a
detainee's connection to terrorist activities.
A second potential rationale that might explain the
administration's proposal in respect to protected information in
military tribunals focuses on the identity of the detainees as alien
enemy combatants sworn to support the terrorist cause.234 The
horrific experience of September 11th and the possibility that
231. Id.
232. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2795 (2006).
233. Id. at 2798.
234. See President's Military Order, supra note 28.
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terrorists will strike again with even more deadly means and
methods may have driven the administration to conclude that
these suspects, as the representatives of Al Qaeda we have in
custody, simply do not deserve the protections we afford criminal
defendants in cases involving protected information. To give them
more access to protected information, in other words, would be to
dignify these individuals as somehow worthy of treatment above
mere contempt. 2 35
We do not propose here to defend the actions of the terrorism
suspects detained as enemy combatants of their moral worth as
individuals. But we would argue that adjusting the level of
protection afforded these individuals in criminal and quasi-
criminal contexts based upon who that individual is, as a factual
matter, based primarily upon the moral assessment of the
individual's alleged actions, reflects a policy long abandoned, and
rightly so, in Anglo-American jurisprudence. 236 As in any case in
which an act condemned by the community has occurred, neither
the community nor its governmental representatives has a special
moral claim in respect to a particular individual until that person
has been determined through fair procedures to be guilty.237
There is a reason that Americans, as citizens whose government
and criminal justice systems deny the efficiencies of the Star
Chamber, should not hasten its return.
A third rationale that might explain the administration's
position, one reflected in nearly every aspect of the
administration's proposed military commissions, is the concern
235. The terrorism suspects detained as unlawful combatants are
understandably demonized as the classic "other," who must be vanquished; as
the Middle East historian Bernard Lewis observed, "[w]e of the West have
often failed catastrophically in respect for those who differ from us. ... But it
is something for which we have striven as an ideal and in which we have
achieved some success, both in practicing it ourselves and in imparting it to
others." BERNARD LEWIS, CULTURES IN CONFLICT: CHRISTIANS, MUSLIMS, AND
JEWS IN THE AGE OF DISCOVERY 78 (1995).
236. See, e.g., Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949) (discussing
repudiation in Anglo-American jurisprudence of the tactics of the Star
Chamber and how, "fuinder our system society carries the burden of proving
its charge against the accused ... not by interrogation of the accused even
under judicial safeguards, but by evidence independently secured through
skillful investigation").
237. See Robert P. Mosteller, Popular Justice, 109 HARV. L. REV. 487, 488-
89 & n.10 (1995) (book review).
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that if we were to afford enemy combatants more process, we
might not be able to convict them in military tribunals. This
concern has been expressed in a number of ways. Under the
initial order, both the accused and his civilian defense counsel
could be excluded from access to protected information before or
during trial at the request of the prosecutor and with the
agreement of the presiding officer. This restriction applied
regardless of the civilian defense counsel's security clearance and
regardless of the fact that the accused has virtually no means to
make use of this information to further ongoing terrorist
operations. Even the accused's military counsel's, access to
protected information was conditioned on the promise that the
military counsel would not reveal information to the accused or
civilian defense counsel without the prior approval of the
presiding officer.
The subsequent military order provided few significant
improvements. The accused and his civilian defense counsel could
still be precluded from access to the evidence. While additional
procedural requirements were put in place, ultimately the chief
prosecutor could decide to offer the evidence and so long as the
presiding officer concluded that the accused received a full and
fair trial, the evidence could be considered by the commission
without the accused or his civilian counsel ever seeing or knowing
about the evidence used to support. the conviction. Such a system
values expediency over individual rights.
Expediency might be relevant if these terrorism suspects
posed some ongoing danger to national security. Here, however,
this practical concern is arguably less compelling because these
individuals are subject to much greater government control - and
will continue to be subject to that control regardless of the
judgment of the military tribunal. But expediency serves another
goal: it provides the government greater assurance that justice
will be done in respect to individuals associated with terrorist
attacks against the United States and its citizens; that
punishment of those individuals will be meted out. The desire to
see justice served in these circumstances is entirely appropriate;
we are not saying either that many of the detainees are not guilty,
or that the government does not have sufficient cases against
them.
Yet many of these prosecutions will likely involve protected
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information that exists in forms that cannot be reduced to useful
evidence that would make sense out of context. Numerous
witnesses are likely not to be available - these suspects are in our
custody and control, after all, as a result of initial detention on the
battlefield. Say, for example, the government's best information
about a particular detainee's involvement in terrorist activities
came from a member of the Northern Alliance. That individual is
unlikely to be available to appear before a military tribunal, and
what evidence the government would present probably exists as
hearsay in an affidavit, report, or similar statement. Protection of
the source of the information and means by which the government
acquired it can be adequately had under the CIPA and MRE
505.238 But the government's fear is that these circumstances
nonetheless will prevent the administration of justice because
allowing the detainee and his lawyer access to the information will
further complicate the tribunal's determination. Such fears ought
not be permitted to trump fairness - expediency at this point is
not a sufficiently compelling interest.
It nearly goes without saying that, under a system in which
the desire for justice prevails over fairness and secret evidence is
the norm, there is a real danger that the accused will be convicted
and punished based upon evidence that has not been fully and
accurately scrutinized, where the accused was denied the
opportunity to assist his counsel in understanding and evaluating
the evidence, and where the accused is denied the opportunity to
discover and present relevant evidence that may undermine the
government's case against him. However reprehensible we may
believe these terrorism suspects to be, and however important for
reasons of justice that the truly guilty be found and punished, the
use of secret evidence has consequences that extend beyond the
cases of these terrorism suspects.
B. The Consequences of Sanctioning the Use of Secret Evidence
Much of the public debate and certainly much of the debate in
Congress following the Hamdan decision centered on concerns
about how our service members would be treated when captured
by an enemy force if we were to treat our enemies unfairly.
238. See United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 471-72 (4th Cir. 2004);
see also United States v. Lonetree, 35 M.J. 396, 409-10 (C.M.A. 1992).
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Concerns about harsh interrogation techniques and the specter of
secret trials were frequently mentioned as reasons why the
Military Commissions Act should afford more protections to alien
enemy combatants. 239 This concern is born of a long history under
the law of war regarding the principle of reciprocity and the notion
that, if we want our forces to be treated fairly by the enemy, we
must treat our enemies fairly when they come under our
control. 240 This is certainly a legitimate issue and an important
reason why the United States should be concerned any time we
plan to use military tribunals to prosecute our enemies.
Reciprocity, however, is not the most important reason why
the administration's initial proposals on the use of protected
information should not have been adopted. Each of the
administration's possible rationales for its attempts to limit an
enemy combatant's access to protected information in military
tribunals is most troubling for the potential effect it can have on
the protections afforded to service members facing courts-martial
and citizens facing criminal trials in Article III courts. If the
administration can significantly limit a defendant and his
attorney's access to relevant and material evidence because of the
status of the defendant, because of the crimes charged against the
defendant, or because it would be difficult to convict the defendant
if he had access to that evidence in military tribunals, then these
same steps can be taken to limit a service member's or a citizen's
access to this kind of evidence in a future situation where the
president believed a similar justification exists.
To answer that constitutional protections would prevent this
from ever occurring does not address the issue: constitutional
standards, and particularly criminal procedure protections, have
almost always been interpreted to mean different things in
different contexts. Consider, for example, the special needs
exception under the Fourth Amendment, which allows precisely
the same searches in a non-criminal context that, in the criminal
context, could be justified only by a showing of probable cause. 241
239. See, e.g., Amicus Cure Brief of Retired Military Officers in Support of
Petitioners at 22, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos. 03-334, 03-343).
240. Id. at 4-6, 26-27.
241. See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619-
630 (1989) (discussing circumstances in which "special needs, beyond the
normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause
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We accordingly suggest an answer lies elsewhere, in the hallmark
of our constitutional democracy: the system of checks and balances
established by the Constitution's structural provisions, and upon
which the Hamdan Court relied.
C. Amending Article 36(b)
Without a sufficient check on the executive's authority, the
substantive language of the Constitution's criminal procedure
protections does little to limit that authority. Our concern here is
to promote the structural checks and balances within the
Constitution itself to limit unfettered executive power. What we
proposes is an amendment to Article 36 of the UCMJ to more
formally establish a process which the president must follow
before the rules regarding the use of protected information in
military commissions can differ from the established procedures
under the UCMJ or the CIPA. A more robust process where the
president's justifications for any departure must be clearly
articulated and vetted by Congress before they can be
implemented, will ensure that the president's power, even in time
of war, will be appropriately checked.
That Congress has the constitutional authority and obligation
to check the executive's power in this area cannot be disputed.
While the president's authority as Commander-in-Chief includes
the discretion to control military forces in the field and matters
related to national defense, he does not have unchecked power.
The Constitution expressly authorizes the Congress, among other
things, to "provide for the common Defense,"24 2 "to raise and
support Armies, 24 3 and to "make rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces. '244 The president, on the
other hand, has the authority to see "that the Laws [are] faithfully
executed, '245 and to serve as the Commander-in-Chief. 246 Given
these textual commitments of authority and responsibility, in no
sense can it be maintained that the president has exclusive
authority over matters related to foreign affairs and national
requirement [of the Fourth Amendment] impracticable" (quotation omitted)).
242. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
243. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
244. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
245. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 3.
246. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
815
816 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 12:772
security.
Congress has consistently exercised its power to raise and
support the armed forces through its appropriations authority.247
Congress is constitutionally required to exercise its appropriation
authority at least every two years. Congress's authority, however,
does not end at the decision to raise an army; it embraces as well
the discretionary authority to regulate the size and composition of
the armed forces. Alexander Hamilton noted in Federalist No. 69
that the president's constitutional power as Commander-in-Chief
relates to the command and direction of military forces; it does not
extend to "the ... regulating of fleets and armies. '248 And, as the
Supreme Court concluded in Loving v. United States,249 while the
Executive may regulate military conduct, he may do so only so
long as those regulations do not conflict with congressional
enactments. 250
It is clear that Congress by statute can control the authority
of the president to establish rules governing military commissions.
As the Court recognized in Hamdan, Congress has already done
this under Article 36(b) by requiring the rules and regulations for
military tribunals and the rules and regulations for courts-martial
to be uniform insofar as practical.251 The language of Article
36(b), however, is currently unclear as to how that practicality
determination should be made and the Court did not resolve that
issue in Hamdan.252 Significantly, the newly passed Military
Commissions Act (MCA) also fails to make any practicality
determination for why the procedures under that act differ from
the procedures under the CIPA or the UCMJ.
247. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
248. THE FEDERALIST No. 69 (Alexander Hamilton), (J. R. Pole ed., 2005)
(original emphasis removed).
249. 517 U.S. 748 (1996).
250. See id. at 772.
251. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2791 (2006).
252. In Hamdan the Court stated that the president had not made an
official determination that it is impractical to apply the rules of courts-
martial to military commissions. The Court further stated that even if
subsection (b)'s requirements may be satisfied without an official
determination, the requirements were not satisfied in this case because there
was nothing on the record to demonstrate why it was impractical for the
military commissions to apply some of the most fundamental protections
found in the rules for courts-martial, including the right of the accused to
confront witnesses. Id. at 2791-92.
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We are not suggesting that such a practicality determination
was required before Congress and the president could enact a
separate statute governing the procedures for military
commissions in the case of terrorism suspects deemed enemy
combatants. But the MCA does not render the requirements of
Article 36 moot. The MCA's jurisdiction is limited to trials of alien
unlawful enemy combatants. 253 The MCA expressly does not alter
or limit the president's authority to establish military
commissions for areas declared to be under martial law or in
occupied territories. 254 There may also be other circumstances in
the future which call for military commissions or tribunals outside
the scope of the MCA.
The requirements of Article 36(b) still apply to military
commissions outside of the MCA and for these commissions
Article 36 is unclear as to how the practicality determination
should be made if those procedures are to depart from the rules
and regulations under the UCMJ. The danger still exists that,
unless the president is required to fully articulate his reasons for
departing from the provisions of the UCMJ, some future military
commission could also allow for trials using secret evidence never
provided to the accused or his counsel.
To remedy this situation and give Congress an opportunity to
fulfill its constitutional responsibility as a check on the executive,
Article 36(b) should be amended as follows: All rules, procedures
and regulations made under this article shall be uniform with each
other as far as practical. Before the President can adopt any rules,
regulations, and procedures for military commissions or other
military tribunals that differ from the rules, regulations, and
procedures for trial by courts-martial, the President must submit to
Congress a justification for these procedures and an explanation of
why the rules, regulations, and procedures for trial by courts-
martial are not practicable.
This amended Article 36(b) will accomplish several objectives.
First, it will recognize, clarify, and codify the Court's holding in
Hamdan that Article 36(b) is intended to ensure consistency in
procedures among courts-martial, military commissions, and other
253. Military Comm'ns Act of 2006, S. 3930, 109th Cong. (2003) available
at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frdfMilitary-Law/pdf/S-3930_passed.pdf.
254. Id.
817
818 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:772
military tribunals. It will also clarify that the president has the
responsibility to make the initial practicality determination if he
decides that military commission or tribunal procedures should
depart from courts-martial procedures. Since it is the president as
Commander-in-Chief who will be the one seeking to establish
military commissions and tribunals, it is appropriate that he
shoulder the burden of showing impracticality.
This amendment also requires the president to more
completely and precisely articulate why he believes a departure
from the courts-martial rules and procedures is necessary. The
amended Article more fully aligns the use of military commissions
and tribunals with their historical precedent. That precedent
strongly favors military commission and tribunal procedures that
are consistent with the procedures used at courts-martial. If the
president wants to depart from that precedent, then he must do
more than simply state that it is not practicable to apply the
principals of law and rules of procedure recognized in trials by
courts-martial. He must fully explain and justify that departure.
This will help to ensure that any departures from courts-martial
procedures are not motivated by a desire simply to develop a more
convenient adjudicatory tool for the government.
Most important, by requiring the president to justify the
procedures and explain why the rules, regulations, and procedures
for court-martial are not practical, the amended Article 36(b) gives
Congress an opportunity to evaluate the president's exercise of his
authority. Congress can review the reasons and explanations put
forth by the president and make its own determination as to
whether the president's decision is justified. If Congress disagrees
with the president then it has the responsibility to take action to
either seek compromise or otherwise prevent the president from
departing from the rules and procedures of courts-martial. The
very act of reviewing these changes - the kind of review
contemplated by the Hamdan court - has benefits: increased
transparency and a chance for citizens to understand the
implications of the changes.255
This amendment to Article 36(b) also ensures that the
president will develop a record, which was lacking in Hamdan,
explaining why courts-martial procedures are impracticable. The
255. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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courts then have a basis upon which to evaluate the president's
determinations to see if they in fact satisfy the requirements of
Article 36(b). And so the third branch of the government may
provide an additional check upon the Executive, allowing yet one
more opportunity to prevent the enactment of procedures, like the
proposal for secret evidence, that bear no relation to the purpose
for which they are being promoted.
V. CONCLUSION
Placing the check on the president's power by amending
Article 36(b) makes legal and practical sense. The use of military
commissions is one way in which the president sought to expand
his war powers and his authority on issues of national security. It
was through the use of military commissions that the president
sought to significantly restrict an accused's access to and use of
protected information in a criminal trial. Had the president's
power gone unchecked by the Court in Hamdan, it is through the
use of military commissions that the president could have
established a precedent that allowed for the government to depart
from some of the most fundamental protections of the law because
of the legal status of the accused, the type of crimes that the
accused is alleged to have been involved in, or as a matter of
convenience. Article 36(b) in its current form does not do enough
to check the president's exercise of power in this critical area. It is
through this proposed amendment to Article 36(b) that Congress
can more properly exercise its systemic check on the executive's
power.
